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Abstract 
Will the natural rate 0£ unemployment be lower in the share 
economy described by Martin Weitzman than in a wage economy? We 
examine this question £or a search economy with an equilibrium 
unemployment rate, a version 0£ Salop's (1979) quits model. 
Equilibrium unemployment is the same in both economies. 
We also examine £irms' short-run adJustment to shocks. 
Share-economy £irms adJUSt output less than wage-economy £irms 
£or both demand shocks and labor-supply shocks. Depending on 
whether rapid output adJustment is stabilizing, a share economy 
may be more or less stable than a wage economy. 
The Natural Rate in a Share Economy * 
1. Introduction 
One 0£ the most interesting macroeconomic policy ideas in 
recent years is Martin Weitzman' s "share economy. " In this 
economy, £irms pay workers not JUst wages, but also shares 0£ 
their net revenues. Weitzman Cl984, 1985> claims that such an 
economy has strong tendencies to stay at £ull employment, as 
:firms act as employment "vacuum cleaners," hiring all 0£ the 
unemployed they can £ind. 
Some have interpreted Weitzman's claim to mean that the 
share economy has a lower natural rate o:f unemployment than the 
wage economy, but this has been controversial,l In part this was 
because in his £ormal work Weitzman used models where the labor 
market is at :full employment in long-run equilibrium. In these 
models he showed that a£ter·a shock the share economy will return 
more quickly to £ull employment than would a wage economy. 
More recently, Weitzman <1986> has shown that, :for the 
Lindbeck and Snower <1984> model 0£ the NAIRU, the long-run level 
0£ unemployment will be lower in a share economy; but he analyzes 
the stability properties 0£ a share economy only £or the case 
•We would ii.Ke to.than.k 1-'amela 8rown, David Colander, Mark 
Kuperberg and James Mulligan :for helpful comments. 
An earlier version was presented at the Eastern Economic 
Association annual meetings, Philadelphia, April 1986. 
1 At a con£erence on the share economy at Vale, Nordhaus 
described one claimed result 0£ the share economy as 
"The share economy will produce a lower natural rate 0£ 
unemployment." 
However, Tobin, at the same conference, asserted that the natural 
rate should not change <Nordhaua and John 1986>. 
where the long-run unemployment level ia zero.2 
Here we examine two questions :for a share economy with a 
positive natural rate 0£ unemployment. Cl) Ia the equilibrium 
natural rate lower in the share economy than in the wage 
economy? (2) I£ the equilibrium is disturbed by a shock how 
will the share economy adJust? We investigate these questions 
using a "search" economy model developed by Salop (1979). In 
Salop' s model, workers queue to obtain Jobs. Once on the JOb, 
they learn about the nonpecuniary aspects 0£ the Job, and some 
workers then decide to quit. The lower the :firm's compensation 
level, the more likely workers are to decide that the negative 
nonpecuniary aspects outweigh the positive compensation. These 
workers quit to search :for a better JOb. <Thus the model might 
be considered a "quits" model.) 
2 
Thia model is useful :for exploring the questions raised here 
:for two reasons. First, Salop has shown that the model will 
generate a positive natural rate 0£ unemployment in a wage 
economy. Second, workers quitting is a reasonable response to 
lower compensation levels in both share and wage £irms. For 
share :firms, quits identify a cost :firms must pay i:f they decide 
to hire more workers since increasing the number o:f workers 
causes compensation to :fall. We :find that the equilibrium 
unemployment rate in this model ia the same in the share economy 
2 Just a :few papers have previously analyzed the share 
economy in models other than Weitzman's. John < 1986) examines 
the e:f:fects o:f shocks on :firms that are wage-takers in both the 
short-run and the long-run. Cooper (1985) emphasises macroecon­
omic externalities caused by private contracts; with price­
setting oligopolistic :firms, share contracts sometimes reduce 
macroeconomic externalities and instabilit�. 
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as in a wage economy. Furthermore, when faced with a shock, 
share-economy firms adJUSt output less than do wage-economy 
firms. Demand shocks do not push share £irms as £er away £rom 
the natural rate 0£ output as wage £irms would be driven, 
con£irming one 0£ Weitzman'e claims. But share £irms also adJust 
output lees when the economy's labor supply changes, thus moving 
more slowly to the new equilibrium. Thus, share £irms might be 
thought 0£ as "vacuum cleaners without auction." 
Salop's "quits" model is only one 0£ a variety 0£ search 
models that have an equilibrium unemployment rate. There are 
elso "e££iciency wage" models (e. g. , Ak�rlo£ and Yellen 1986, 
Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) and models with quits, hires, and 
vacancies (e. g. , Pisearides 1985, 1986, Jeckman and Layard 
1986). In these latter models £irms search £or workers but 
be£ore e £irm can hire a worker, it must incur a £ixed cost 0£ 
first creating a vacency. Workers are more likely to take the 
JOb and lees likely to quit at higher compensation levels. For 
simple £orme 0£ these models, the same equilibrium results hold 
es £or the quits model. These cesea are examined in the 
Appendix. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 brie£ly describes the quits model, modified to include the 
share economy. Section 3 shows that the equilibrium unemployment 
rate is the same in the share and wage economies. Section 4 
shows that share firms adJUSt output less in response to shocks 
than do wage firms. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2 .  Share Firms in a Quite Model 
In this model firms are monopolistic competitors. They face 
an unlimited supply 0£ labor at the going wage, so long as the 
equilibrium rate 0£ unemployment is positive. <This and other 
assumptions of the model are discussed in more detail in Salop 
1979). Firms use labor and some form of "capital" to produce 
output, but capital is not explicitly modeled. 
The probability that workers quit firms is described by the 
£unction Q = Q(W/W(l-U>>, with 0' (•) < 0 and Q''(. ) > O. 
Workers compare their own compensation, W, with the compensation 
received at the representative firm, W, and are less likely to
quit when their own compensation is high. They are also less 
likely to quit when the unemployment rate, U, is high. Some 
workers quit even when W = W, since they may dislike nonpecuniary 
aspects of the JOb, 
When workers quit, firms incur a coat y per worker, where y 
represents the opportunity coat of training a new worker to take 
the place of the worker who has quit. <Firms pay all workers 
alike, so they cannot charge workers the coat of training),3 
The firm's pro£it £unction is 
U = PY - WL - yQ ( •)L. (1) 
P Y  is total revenue. The wage £irm is differentiated £rem the 
share firm by the components of compensation, W. For the wage 
£irm, all compensation is in the £orm of a wage, w. For the 
3 Alternatively, workers who quit could leave a vacancy in 
the production process. The cost of a quit would then be related 
to the value 0£ output, P. The results'are not affected by this 
alternative assumption. 
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share £irm, compensation has two compone�ts, a wage component w 
and a share, X, 0£ net revenues to be shared, Rs. Each worker 
thus receives W = w + �8/L. Ra equals the £irm's revenues minus 
costs, excluding the share compensation: 
Rs= PY - wL - )'Q<•)L. (2) 
1 So n - Ra = -XR8, and Ra = 1-:-�n. The share £irm's pro£it 
£unction can there£ore be rewritten as n = <1 - X)Rs, or
n = <1 - X) [py - wL - )'Q(•)Ll .4 (3)
The £irm maximizes pro£its by £inding the optimal employment 
size, L, and an optimal share rate, X. Aa Weitzman has 
discussed, £or reasons not in the model, £irms and workers would 
agree on an all-wage compensation structure i£ given a choice.5 
Thus, some restraint must be placed upon compensation--either 
a ceiling upon w or a £loor upon X. Weitzman <1985) chose to set 
w = 0, which is closer to setting <a maximum> w, with £irma then 
choosing X. 
The £irst-order condition £or L is 
4 This pro£it £unction already reveals many 0£ our later 
results. The share relationship does not directly modi£y any 0£ 
the terms in the wage £irm's pro£it £unction <although w should 
be lower £or a share £irm with positive pro£its). Rather, the 
share £irm essentially maximizes wage-£irm pro£its times a 
constant £actor. Alternative de£initions 0£ the "share" change 
the £unction, but do not change our main results. 
5 Thia does not hold in more complete models 0£ £irm and 
worker behavior. "Optimal contracts" generally do not have £ixed 
wages <Stiglitz 1986), and might be like share contracts. Firm 
and worker risk and risk pre£erences must be modeled to determine 
"optimal•• contracts. See also Cooper's remarks in Nordhaus and 
John (1986). 
Cooper <1985) also raises an important question when he 
asks why the wage system has evolved. Are there important 
reasons £or a wage syatem that have not as yet been identi£ied? 
Does changing it have costs that have not as yet been discerned? 
MRPL 
Now, 
TIL = <1 - X>CMRPL - w - yO<·> - �:�.:.�� Wl 
W<l -U) 
is 
W
L 
the marginal 
= --�--rn 
1 - X L 
! 
L 
revenue product 0£ labor, a 
n -
c2>· 
Substituting into (4) and collecting terms,
( 4 )  
£unction 0£ L. 
The £irst order condition, IlL = 0, holds i£ the term in brackets 
on the right-hand side 0£ this expression equals zero or: 
w = MRPL - )'O< • > + �:�.:.� 
X 
L!f. 
<5> 
W<l-U) l - X 
(5) can be interpreted as the wage rate equals the marginal 
revenue product 0£ labor (as it would in neoclassical models) 
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plus two quit £actors. First, there are additional costs because 
any new worker will quit with some probability. Second, hiring 
an additional worker in a share £irm will lower the compensation 
0£ all current workers, increasing the probability 0£ quits and 
imposing an additional cost on the £irm. 
The £irst-order condition £or X is 
n� = (-1) (PY - wL -)'Q<. >Ll 
+ 
(1 - X) ( - �:�.:.��lW • 
" W<l -U) A 
WX in turn is 
w = <--! __ + -�--2> � + --- �--- u 1 n --- �--- u X 1 - X <1-X) L <1 -X)L X = (i:�)2L + <1 ->.>L X 
Substituting into (6) we obtain 
- �:�.:.�<--! __ + xn�>· 
W<l-U) 
1 - A " 
But the term in brackets is JUSt Il/(1-X)� collecting terms, 
(6) 
TIX [1 + =�
}'9�i.:�J 
W <l - U) 
TT - --- -- -1 - X _}'9�i.:�­W <l - U) 
1T 
1 - X 
ITX = 0 if the right-hand side of this equation equals zero. 
So the first-order condition holds when 
Q'(•) = - �i!_:_�� 
)' 
(7) 
Finally, there ia the constant-profit condition, which 
includes the firma's implicit cost of capital k. 
1T = <1 -)..) [py - wL - )'O<- )Ll = k. (8) 
(8) represents long-run free entry and exit of firms under 
monopolistic competition. 
3. Equilibrium Unemployment with Share and Wage Firms 
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The equilibrium unemployment for share and wage f irma can be 
compared in several ways. The moat direct ia to observe the 
share firm's first-order conditions. With some manipulation, 
they take the same form that Salop found for wage firms. 
Substituting Q' (•) from <7> into (5), we obtain 
X 1T 
w + i-=-� L = MRPL - )'O (•). (9) 
(9) can be interpreted as the firm's choice 0£ overall compenaa-
tion; it can be rewritten as 
W = M RPL - )'O < • ) (10). 
Total compensation equals the marginal revenue product of labor 
minus the marginal cost 0£ replacing workers who quit. So long 
as both w and A are positive, the firm is not constrained at all 
by the requirement to pay a "sh,,re." It looks purely at total 
compensation W. 
(10) ia identical to Salop'a equation £or a wage firm <see
8 
his equation (9), 1979) except that in Salop's paper W is the 
wage. In both cases this equation represents en internal 
equilibrium for the firm. Unemployment exists in the models 
because there is e queue of workers who went Jobs but firms ere 
unwilling to hire them. If the equilibrium compensation in both 
share and wage firms is the same, then the length 0£ the queue 
and therefore the unemployment rate should be the same in both 
system s. In other words, the natural rate of unemployment is the 
same in both economies. 
Thia system has no exces s  demand for labor at the long-run 
equilibrium point. This differs from the Weitzman models where 
excess demand for labor exists at the long-run full employment 
equilibrium point.6 Unemployed workers are not being hired 
because it is not profitable for firms to expand their employment 
beyond existing levels. 
Still this result is consistent with Weitzman's argument 
that the two systems are isomorphic and with Tobin's view that 
the natural rate should be the same in both systems <Nordhaus and 
John 1986) . 
This result should not be surprising. Workers and firms 
both know the value of compensation, they can correctly value its 
two components, and they value the components in the same way. 
The results would be different if firms and workers had different 
6 It does not differ, however, from Weitzman's results with 
a positive natural rate of unemployment. Weitzman ( 1986) 
explores two cases; in one the economy is at full employment in 
long-run equilibrium; in the other the economy is at leas than 
full employment in long-run equilibrium. He shows how the excess 
demand process will work for the full employment case but not for 
the less than full employment case. 
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axpectationa about future profits. If workers were more 
"optimistic" about their own firm's future profits per worker 
than the firm was, they would quit leas at any level of 
compensation and that would lead to a lower equilibrium level of 
unemployment. Thia could occur if the firm intended to increase 
the number of workers but did not inform the workera.7 
There is another way to show that the share economy does not 
affect equilibrium unemployment. Assume a pure wage economy. 
Then reduce wages, allowing firms to substitute share compensa-
tion. Thia problem is equivalent to the problem where w changes 
and the effects upon U, L and X are determined by differentiating 
the three equations of the equilibrium model, using the implicit-
£unction rule. These equations are the representative firm's 
first-order conditions and the zero-profit constraint, (4), <7>, 
and (8). The effects of changing w can be found by solving the 
matrix equation 
<4>L <4>x <4>u 
dL -(4) dw w 
<7>L <7>x <7>u 
dX -(7) ( 11) dw w 
(8)L <8>x <8>u 
dU 
-(8) ciw w 
with partial derivatives with respect to the equations written 
<-) L and so on. Solving for the full effects of w, 
dL 0 dX - <1-X>2 � < 0 dU o. (12) = dw dw lT dw 
7 Weitzman's view that firms would hire more workers that 
would 'dilute' each worker's share is consistent with this 
interpretation. So are the hostile criticisms of labor union 
leaders. See Epstein 1986. 
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dX/dw has the value that keeps W constant. Thus, directly 
considering a change in the external constraint gives the same 
conclusions. 
While the introduction of sharing itself may not affect the 
natural rate of unemployment, its actual implementation could. To 
overcome resistance to the acceptance of share arrangements, 
Weitzman has proposed a subsidy (or lower tax) on share compen-
sation <Weitzman 1985, p. 946>. Several authors, working with 
similar search models, have found policies that reduce the 
natural rate of unemployment. These policies change firms' 
marginal cost of labor, while remaining revenue-neutral. F"or 
example, Jackman and Layard (1986> propose a wage tax that is 
offset (for firms as a whole) by a per-worker subsidy. The 
firm's profit £unction under their tax-subsidy system looks like 
lT = P Y - W <1 + t>L + SL - )'O <.>L 
with t the tax rate and S the subsidy. Jackman and Layard <1986> 
prove that this tax-subsidy scheme reduces the natural rate of 
unemployment. 
F"or Weitzman's subsidy to be revenue-neutral, a tax must be 
impoaed--perhaps on wage compensation. Such a tax-subsidy 
arrangement would affect firm behavior and the natural rate of 
unemplbyment, much as Jackman and Layard have argued, but it can 
be shown that the direction of the effect depends on the specific 
form of taxes and subsidies chosen and in some cases parameter 
values, Thus such arrangements should be carefully designed; but 
a combination of tax-subsidy arrangements and sharing could lead 
to a lower natural rate and <see below) leas adJustment to 
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shocks. 
The British government is adopting a subsidy on share 
compensation <Economist 1986>, but this represents an attempt to 
reduce workers' compensation to its equilibrium level. 
4. Share Firms' Response to Shocks 
How do share £irma react to macroeconomic shocks?8 Weitzman 
shows in his models that the share economy has lower unemployment 
rates during the period 0£ adJustment to a shock. This section 
examines adJustment to two shocks: <1> a sudden increase in the 
supply 0£ workers, who "parachute" uni£ormly into the economy, 
and <2> a sudden fall in the marginal revenue product of labor. 
<1> Increased supply 0£ labor. We examine the response of a 
share firm and a wage firm to this shock. Both firms are at 
equilibrium when the shock occurs; thus, they are paying the 
same level of compensation and have the same output. 
When the workers suddenly "parachute" into the economy, 
unemployment is instantly increased. In both economies, workers 
respond by reducing their quit rate, so firms in both economies 
will adJust output. 9 In Weitzman's analysis of shocks neither 
wage rates, w, nor share rates, �, can be instantly changed, 
8 In interpreting the firm's response to shocks we assume 
the £irm reacts only to the initial change in the unemployment 
rate or demand for the product. <The optimal full reaction path 
of the firms is very dif£icult to calculate <Barro 1972).) 
Firms' decisions to h�re will clearly affect unemployment, and 
in the share economy W as well. We ignore these effects, and so 
analyze only the initial response to the shock. 
9 Workers observe the change in unemployment, but can�ot 
immediately observe other firms' changes in wage rates, so W in 
the quits term remains constant. 
but employment levels can adJust. However, the share £irm 
a££ects compensation when it changes L. Thus, while the wage 
firm £aces a constant W in adJusting its output, the share £irm 
£inds its compensation changing--£alling, as we shall show. 
The e££ect of increased labor supply on wage £irms can be 
£ound £rom equation <10) with W interpreted as the wage rate: 
dL 
ciii > 0 <16) 
MRPLL is the second derivative 0£ the revenue function with 
respect to L and is negative. The entire expression is thus 
positive. In other words, an increase in labor supply that 
initially increases the unemployment rate causes £irms to hire 
additional workers. 
Thia result is different from Weitzman'a. In his model 
there is no quit £unction and entry of new labor into the labor 
£orce does not affect the wage £irm' s short-run optimum--i. e. , 
employment remains at its original level. 
The effect 0£ increased labor supply on share firms comes 
£rom equation <5>: 
dL 
ciu > 0 <17) 
Since share compensation £alls as L rises, WL < o. Also, 
0" (. ) > 0. The full expression is positive. A larger labor 
£orce causes employment to expand. 
Which economy responds better to this shock? Employment 
12 
expands in both. Unemployment will be lower in the economy where 
employment increases more. Comparing equations (16> and <17>, it 
is not clear in which economy the expansion will be greater. !£ 
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the second-order terms containing Q''(•l are very small,10 then 
<17) becomes 
dL 
ciu > o. <17') 
With this simpli£ication the wage economy does better. The only 
di£ference between (16) and <17') is that W appears in the 
numerator 0£ (16) and w in the numerator 0£ <17'). Since 
compensation in both systems is initially the same and w is only 
the £ixed part 0£ share compensation, w < W. The wage system, 
therefore, reacts more strongly than does the share system. In 
the short run, unemployment will be lower in a wage system. 
This is the opposite of Weitzman's conclusion. In his model 
the share economy's greater £lexibility in compensation encoura-
ges the firm to hire more workers. In this model share compensa-
tion also £alls as employment goes up, but as the share firm's 
compensation falls, quit rates rise. These two effects of£set 
each other. Furthermore, the higher unemployment rate raises the 
cost 0£ increasing the probability 0£ quits - the last term in 
equation (5). The wage firm does not change its compensation 
level, so when it hires more workers the probability 0£ quits is 
not changed. The expansionary e££ects are therefore greater Ci£ 
the second-order terms are ignored as in (17')), 
(2) Demand Shock. The demand shock changes the marginal 
revenue product of labor. We model that by assuming that the 
10 The terms containing 0' '(.) are second-order terms 
describing how lower compensation a££ects the rate 0£ change 0£ 
the probability 0£ quits. The £irst-order terms which describe 
the direct e££ect 0£ lower compensation and the adJustment 0£ the 
quit rate to lower compensation levels cancel each other and do 
not appear in equation (17>. 
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shock affects the first-order condition £or choice 0£ L, (5), by 
a fixed amount o, and calculating dL/do £or the two systems,11 
Since the share firm's compensation adJusts automatically with 
the change in revenue due to the shock, it changes output less. 
Equation (10), £or the wage £irm, is now W = MRPL - )'OC•) - o. 
dL 
do 
(18) 
Adding the same - o term to (5) , the share firm's adJustment is 
dL 
ci6 < o. <19) 
Both 0£ the terms in the denominator are negative, so £or this 
shock the share £irm sdJUsts labor less than the wage £irm. I£ 
the Q"(·) term is very small, then the two reactions will be
about the same. Since the share firm's adJustment in labor 
supply is less than or equal to the wage firm's, fluctuations in 
output should be smaller in the share economy. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has shown £or standard models that the share and 
wage economies have the same natural rate 0£ unemployment. 
Furthermore, in such models with a positive natural rate 0£ 
unemployment share £irms adJust output less in response to both 
demand and labor supply shocks; their demand adJustment keeps 
the economy closer to the natural rate, but their labor supply 
11 I£ the demand curve is linear and the production £unction 
has a constant marginal product 0£ labor, a demand shift can be 
interpreted as the o shi£t. 
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adJustment slows movement to the natural r�te. 
These results are different from those obtained by Weitzman 
<1986) who uses a different approach to defining the natural rate 
of unemployment. As Weitzman states, his model may be more 
applicable to a European environment where unions are stronger. 
These results suggest that reaching any firm conclusions 
about the superiority of a share economy may be difficult. 
Furthermore, these models of equilibrium unemployment may be 
leaving out important factors. For example, current models do 
not include adJustments to shocks. Perhaps the natural rate 
of unemployment should be defined over a range of shocks and 
adJustment to them. If, in that case, the share economy has 
superior adJustment properties equilibrium unemployment would be 
smaller. 
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Appendix 
This appendix sketches the efficiency -wage and quits-hires-
vacancies models for share firms. The models follow Jackman and 
Layard (1986>, except that the firms are monopolistic competitors 
and so choose price and labor. These models have natural rates 
of employment similar to the "quits" economy. For these models, 
the share economy does not affect the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. 
Efficiency-wage models <Akerlof and Yellen 1986, Shapiro and 
Stiglitz 1984> have a function that affects productivity: 
workers work harder at higher wages. Output per worker is 
ye(•), with e(•) = e(=--- �---). 
W<1 - U> 
The firm's revenues are Pye<•>L and the firm's profits are 
U = Pye(•)L - WL. 
A wage firm would maximize <Al> by choice of L and W: 
e' ( • ) 
��:�.:� � - L 
W<l - U> 
��!_:_!!� 
P)' 
0, so 
<Al) 
< A2) 
or, defining the elasticity of price with respect to labor as e, 
W = Py (l + 1/e)e(•). 
Substituting for P)', 
w W<l - U)(l + 1/e)-��.:�. 
e' ( •) 
<A3>
With the share rule, profits are <Just as in the quits economy>, 
U = <1 - J>..) [P)'El< • >L - wLJ. 
<1 - 1\>CP<l + llE>)'e<-> + ��:�.:.�1=w - wJ 
W<l - U) L 
-[·] + <1 - 1\)�:r�:�.:.�1= \111' = o, 
\11<1 - U) 
o. 
- --�-- + (1 - }\)=��:�:� (i-�-�)2 � l - 1' 
W<1 - U> 
O, so again 
W<1 - U) e'<·> = ---Py __ _ 
Substituting into <A3) £or Py, 
- e <.) w = \11(1 - U)(1 + llE)e;(:)-
w + 
+ ��!_:_���:�.:.�L W 
e'< - >W<l - U) L 
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<A4> 
<A5> 
<A6> 
<A4> and <A7) are the same. The same equivalence exists here as 
in the quits model. 
The quits-hires-vacancies model modi£ies the '"quits'" 
£unction by including the ratio 0£ vacancies to unemployment. In 
this.model, £irma require capital or incur some £ixed cost per 
worker to produce. Only with that coat incurred can they attempt 
to £ill a vacancy. Thus the £irm incurs a cost i£ the position 
is not £illed, Just as with the quits model. That coat is 
y+<1 +VIN>, where y is the worker's marginal product and+ is 
the coat 0£ having the position, while V is the number 0£ 
vacancies and N is the number 0£ positions available to be 
£illed. At equilibrium, the £irm maintains a constant labor 
£orce, so that de£ining H as the probability 0£ £iring a worker 
£or a vacancy and Q as the probability that a worker will quit, 
VH = ON. Substituting, the £irm's pro£its are 
IT =  PY - WL - y+<l + �>LH 
The basic behavioral relationships are that 
Q = Q(�,-�-) 
W VIN 
H = H<�,-�->. 
W VIN 
For a wage £irm, the £irst-order conditions are 
o. 
1 
lS 
< A7> 
<AS> 
<A9> 
<This model reaches equilibrium unemployment by the UIV ratio in 
Q < • ) and H < • ) : while £irms choose W, they cannot a££ect WIW: 
rather, the UIV ratio has to change £or overall equilibrium.) 
Substituting £or y+ in <AS>, 
<AlO) 
For a share £irm, 
n = <1 - }\)[PY - wL - y + �)LJ. <All> 
In a share economy, a change in L changes W, so 
o, 
w <Al2> 
0 
QWH - HWQ 
- �·---------- = 1 
W H2 
Again substituting £or �+, 
Q W H2 QWH - HWQ � rr w 
= 
MRPL + <l + H)O�H-=-H�O - O�H-=-H�Q 1-=-� c: 
w + Q W H2 MRPL + <1 + ->---------, H QWH - HWQ 
<AlO> and <A14) are the same. 
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<A1 3) 
CA1 4) 
This appendix has shown in several standard models that the 
equilibrium rate 0£ unemployment is the same in share and wage 
economies. These models have been used to show that such 
policies as TIP, MAP, and wage arbitration will reduce the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. The explanation is the 
in the main text: £irms and workers care about overall 
same as 
compensation and in these models they can accurately observe 
overall compensation. 
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